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5Foreword
In 2007, the Swedish government decided to reduce the number of 
countries with which it had development co-operation. Laos (in 
which development co-operation began in 1974), along with Viet-
nam (since 1967) and Sri Lanka (since 1958), were the three coun-
tries in Asia where development co-operation would be phased out.  
Along with the government decision to phase out, came a deci-
sion to document and evaluate the Swedish effort in these countries. 
The following report is a synthesis of these evaluations, with analyses 
of up to 53 years of development co-operation.
The report aims to do more than just synthesize. With a compar-
ative analysis the aim is to be able to identify lessons that could have 
broader value, for policy makers, as well as for development co-oper-
ation agencies and actors. The evaluators looked for common fea-
tures across the co-operation with the three countries and analysed 
them in light of the longevity of Swedish co-operation. The report 
goes beyond this initial analysis and looks at the effectiveness of con-
tributions in one-party states and for lessons for working in countries 
in which a conflict arises. Finally, the study provides a sketch of deci-
sion-making criteria for phasing out development co-operation. 
These can be useful even when considering phasing in. 
Sida hopes that some of the lessons drawn from our very long 
development co-operation with these countries can provide insights 
of value not only for Sweden, but for other actors and countries 
working to reduce poverty in the world. 
Annika Nordin Jayawardena
Head of Monitoring and Evaluation Unit
Department for Organisational Development
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The overall goal of the Swedish International Development Coop-
eration Agency (Sida) is to contribute to making it possible for poor 
people to improve their living conditions.
In 2007 the Swedish Government decided to reduce the number 
of countries with which Sweden carried out development co-opera-
tion. This included cessation of development co-operation with 
Laos, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam, and in accordance with Swedish 
development co-operation strategies, Sida and the embassies/coun-
try teams of those three countries initiated an evaluation study to 
document the long periods of development co-operation and assess 
results and experiences. Part One of this exercise was documenta-
tion to provide an historical account of the development co-opera-
tion with Laos, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. This was undertaken in 
2009–2010.
In 2010, via an international competitive bidding process, Sida 
awarded a contract to GHD to undertake Part Two: an evaluation 
study of long-term development co-operation between Sweden and 
the three countries.
Sida deemed the content of the resulting evaluation reports to be 
sufficiently valuable to merit a synthesis of the results of these three 
country-level evaluations and to enable communication of some gen-
eral lessons learned to a broader audience, including those interested 
in long term development co-operation and evaluation.
This report provides that further analysis and synthesis. It was 
prepared by Team Leader, Mark McGillivray with support from 
Evaluation Consultants Allan Pankhurst and David Carpenter.
Preface
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1. Purpose, Scope and Method 
of Synthesis Report
1.1 InTRoDuCTIon
Swedish development co-operation with Sri Lanka, Vietnam and 
Laos commenced in 1958, 1967 and 1974, respectively. It ended with 
Sri Lanka in 2010, with Laos in 2011, and will end in its ‘traditional’ 
form with Vietnam in 2011 and partner-driven form in 2013. End-
ing development co-operation with these countries is part of a larger 
process of greater partner country focus for the Swedish develop-
ment co-operation. Such a focus is consistent with efforts to increase 
the effectiveness, efficiency and quality of this co-operation by free-
ing resources for a deeper involvement in areas where Swedish 
efforts are continued.
Sida commissioned evaluations of each of these three long-term 
development co-operation programmes in 2010. The overall pur-
pose of the evaluations was to provide:
1.  an historical account of the development co-operation between 
Sweden and each country by documenting and recording what 
has taken place and been achieved; and
2.  a summary of the experiences and lessons-learned from the co-
operation in order to guide each recipient Government as well as 
other donors and international partners that may step in after 
Sida, regarding the possible continuation of the different projects 
or programmes, but also future development co-operation per se.
The primary aim of the evaluation process was to provide Sida with 
an understanding of how its development activities have supported 
poverty reduction in each country over time. Specific objectives 
include analysing the background and development context for 
interventions, analysing the reported results and impacts, and for-
mulating conclusions and general lessons-learned.
The evaluation findings were provided in a separate report for 
each country and included lessons learned for future development 
13
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co-operation. The reports were widely circulated for comments from 
stakeholders and eventually disseminated in the three partner coun-
tries in November 2011. Final evaluation reports were submitted to 
Sida in January 2012.
Sida decmed the content of the reports to be sufficiently valuable 
to merit further analysis. The agency sought to synthesise the results 
of the three country-level evaluations and to communicate some 
general lessons learned to a broader audience, including those inter-
ested in long term development co-operation and evaluation.
This report provides the further analysis required by Sida. It 
summarises the key findings of the three country-level evaluation 
reports, compares the relative achievements of each development co-
operation program, and discusses the factors that influenced these 
achievements. This comparative analysis has the potential to add 
significant value to the country reports, which, given their nature 
were specific to Swedish development co-operation with each indi-
vidual country without critical reflection across all three. This report 
also compares Swedish aid to each country through the lens of les-
sons learned from the other two countries.
1.2 PuRPoSE, SCoPE AnD METhoDS
The overall purpose of this synthesis report is to provide some gen-
eral lessons that can inform the decision-making processes within 
development co-operation, including with regard to the phasing in, 
implementation, or phasing out of development co-operation in 
partner countries. Consistent with the status of cooperation with the 
three countries studied, there is an emphasis on lessons learned in 
phasing out of development co-operation. The report does not evalu-
ate the decision to phase out of any of the three countries, but seeks 
merely to inform any future decision-making.
In considering these decision-making criteria the report is guided 
by the following questions:
1.  Are there common features of Swedish development co-operation 
with all three countries, besides the long-term approach?
2.  Are these features due to the length of stay in the country, or 
could they have come about in other ways?
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3.  What are the links between these features and the factors that 
have impeded or contributed to the success of Sweden’s develop-
ment co-operation?
4.  Depending on how well placed a donor might be to achieving its 
developmental objectives in a country, what implications does 
a decision to phase out have on the sustainability of these achieve-
ments?
5.  What do the evaluations say in terms of Sweden’s involvement in 
one-party states and the effectiveness of its contributions?
6.  What lessons learned from Sweden’s long-term co-operation can 
be of use when a conflict arises in a country with which it is 
engaged in long-term development co-operation?
These questions are addressed purely by critical, comparative reflec-
tion on the findings of the evaluation report for each of the three 
countries. No additional data collection or fieldwork has been under-
taken.
1.3 REPoRT STRuCTuRE AnD ConTEnTS
This report consists of four chapters following this introduction.
Chapter 2 summarises the key findings of each evaluation. It 
focuses on the answers to the primary evaluation question, which 
was as follows. How, and to what extent, did Sida’s development assistance 
contribute to poverty reduction in Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Laos? It also pro-
vides information on the findings of the evaluations as to the extent 
to which Sida’s aid responded to important multidimensional devel-
opment needs in Vietnam, Laos and Sri Lanka, whether this aid was 
effectively and efficiently delivered, to what extent did Sida’s devel-
opment co-operation nurture an enabling environment for poverty 
reduction in the three partner countries and what lessons can be 
learned from the evaluations that can improve development effec-
tiveness in the future.
Chapter 3 provides the synthesis. It analyses the findings of each 
country program evaluation and suggests what these findings may 
reveal about development co-operation in the other two countries 
and for long term development co-operation more generally. This 
chapter will be guided primarily by the six questions outlined in 
Section 1.2 above.
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Chapter 4 discusses development criteria that should inform deci-
sions relating to the phasing out (or otherwise) of development co-
operation in partner countries. These criteria are in the form of four 
questions that can be asked about any donor development co-opera-
tion programme with a partner country. It also considers questions 
that should be asked in the context of establishing a new develop-
ment co-operation program with a partner country.
Chapter 5 provides a summary of the main points and findings of 
this report, as well as highlighting key areas that require further 
investigation.
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2. Key Evaluation Study Findings: 
A Summary
2.1 InTRoDuCTIon
Separate reports for Laos, Vietnam and Sri Lanka provided an 
assessment of the contribution Sweden has made to development 
and poverty reduction in each country over the lengthy period of 
development co-operation in each case. The periods cover 38 years 
for Laos, 53 years for Sri Lanka and 45 years for Vietnam1.
As set out in Chapter 1, Introduction, the purpose of the evalua-
tions was to provide: (1) An historical account of the development co-
operation between Sweden and each country; and (2) A summary of 
the experiences and lessons-learned from the co-operation in order 
to guide each recipient Government as well as other donors and 
international partners that may step in after Sida, regarding the pos-
sible continuation of the different projects or programmes, but also 
future development co-operation per se.
In accordance with contemporary international development 
thinking the evaluations adopted a multidimensional conceptualisa-
tion of poverty. This conceptualisation is based on the recognition 
that quality of life or well-being depends not only on income, but on 
levels of health, education, participation, personal security, political 
participation and many other factors.
The evaluations did not seek to attribute in any quantitative way 
a causal link between Swedish development co-operation and pov-
erty reduction, or other high level development outcomes. They did 
however, point to associations between development co-operation 
and development outcomes in each country. The resulting reports 
commented as to whether these associations might be causal, but go 
no further than that.
Evaluating long periods of development co-operation is a complex 
task, requiring an informative and rigorous methodological approach. 
The three evaluations were supported by an Aid Quality Evaluation 
Framework (AQEF) to evaluate the overall impact of the Sida pro-
1 The evaluation only covered to 2011. The Vietnam programme continues 
until 2013.
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gramme in each country (rather than the effectiveness of individual 
programmes). Under this framework aid effectiveness is defined in 
terms of the impact of aid on multidimensional poverty reduction. 
The AQEF consists of five components, against which the quality of 
aid is assessed using a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data. 
They are: (1) absorptive capacity; (2) quality of public sector financial 
management; (3) consistency with Paris declaration principles; (4) con-
sistency of aid delivery with partner country sectoral priorities; and (5) 
consistency of aid delivery with donor country programme strategies.
The evaluations employed qualitative and quantitative methods in 
a complementary way to interrogate different types of evidence about 
the context, evolution and outcomes of Swedish development co-oper-
ation with each country. For each country evaluation, quantitative 
analysis drew on available sources of data, such as Sida’s own databas-
es, data provided by the partner government, the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, the UNDP’s Human Development Report 
and the OECD DAC’s International Development Statistics. Such 
data informed the macro analysis of development and aid trends in the 
Country Development Profile. The data enabled assessment of chang-
es in various dimensions of the quality of life, income poverty in par-
ticular. Change in indicators such as per capita income and its annual 
rates of growth, life expectancy, adult literacy, child and infant mortal-
ity, maternal mortality and the percentage of people living below the 
income poverty line were analysed. Key multidimensional indicators 
are also presented, such as the UNDP’s Human Development Index 
(HDI). Comprehensive information on this index has been published 
by the UNDP since 1990, with HDI scores being available from 1970 
onwards. Recognising that economic performance is an important 
driver of poverty reduction, GDP growth rates are also examined and 
key economic reforms and structural changes identified.
The qualitative component of this evaluation involved thematic 
and longitudinal case studies, with flexible exploration of the evalua-
tion questions through the use of semi-structured interviews, focus 
groups and analysis of existing documentation.
Case studies were used to explore the evaluation questions in 
a context-specific way. The case studies provided an in-depth under-
standing of events and trends in Sweden’s aid in the three countries 
through the perspective of key actors. A small sample of case studies 
in each country was selected purposively for their richness of infor-
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mation in relation to key time periods, people, events and impacts. 
The historical nature of this evaluation, which must evaluate the 
cumulative impact of many activities over several decades, distin-
guishes it from a typical project or programme evaluation.
Longitudinal case studies were used to illustrate the changing 
nature and impact of Sida’s involvement in a particular sector. Lon-
gitudinal cases exposed the drivers behind, and outcomes of changes 
in, Sweden’s development co-operation within a selected sector. 
Analysing one connected set of interventions in this way informed 
the evaluation on responsiveness, relevance and effectiveness. Longi-
tudinal cases were identified based on sectors where Sida has had 
a very long-standing engagement; in each country, only a very lim-
ited number of sectors or areas of operation met this requirement.
Thematic case studies were used to assess the nature and impact 
of a package of interventions during different historical phases. 
Drawing on the provisional historical phases of Swedish develop-
ment co-operation in each country, a set of two to three case studies 
were selected in each major phase to gain a deeper understanding of 
critical impacts and themes during each period.
The combination of longitudinal and thematic analysis is an inno-
vative approach to longitudinal evaluation; it has enabled a compre-
hensive understanding of how Sida’s aid effort evolved, as well as an 
understanding of impacts and lessons in key thematic areas.
2.2 SwEDEn’S DEVELoPMEnT  
Co-oPERATIon wITh LAoS, VIETnAM 
AnD SRI LAnKA
Table 2.1 sets out key features of Sweden’s development co-operation 
with each country. It also presents the phases of development co-
operation identified during the profiling of country development and 
Sida’s corresponding country programmes. These phases were used 
in the selection of thematic case studies.
Table 2.2 highlights the case studies selected by phase for each 
country.
The findings and observations derived from quantitative analysis 
of the development context of each country and the qualitative anal-
ysis supported by the selected case studies are then summarised in 
Table 2.3.
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2.3 RESPonSES To ThE KEy EVALuATIon 
QuESTIonS
The primary question requested of the evaluations undertaken in 
each country was:
  How, and to what extent, did Sida’s development co-operation contrib-
ute to poverty reduction?
The reference to ‘contribution’ in the primary evaluation ques-
tion highlights the focus on exploring the plausible associations 
between Sida’s aid and changes in poverty over the long periods of 
co-operation, rather than supplying definitive proof of any causal 
relationship between the two.
The country-based evaluations were also requested by Sida 
to address four other (sub-) questions. These are each set out below, 
together with a summary of the findings of each evaluation  
by country.
Answering the fourth sub-question draws together the analysis in 
sub-questions one to three to identify the most salient lessons for 
development co-operation programmes.
1.  To what extent did Sida’s aid respond to important 
multidimensional development needs of the country?
Laos
 There appears to be clear evidence that Sida responded to press-
ing multidimensional development needs in Laos. Examples 
include:
•  The Sida focus on building transport and communications 
infrastructure in the 1970s and 1980s was a response to the 
need to rebuild infrastructure owing to the damage done 
during the Second Indo-Chinese War in Vietnam.
•  Sida’s shift in the 1990s and beyond from the national road 
network towards provincial roads was an appropriate 
response to a pressing need to provide access to markets and 
health services for the rural poor.
•  Support for the better management of forestry resources 
from the mid-1980s and for governance and public adminis-
tration reform and greater statistics capacity from the mid-
1990s was a response to increasingly recognised needs in 
these areas at the time.
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•  Sida’s adoption in 1995 of poverty reduction as the overarch-
ing objective of its development co-operation programme in 
Laos was consistent with the extent of poverty at the time.
Vietnam
 There is clear evidence that Sida responded to important multidi-
mensional development needs in Vietnam. Examples include:
•  Sweden’s support to the Bai Bang Paper Mill and for con-
structing the Children’s Hospital in Hanoi and the General 
Hospital in Uong Bi were, broadly speaking, consistent with 
the immediate needs after the war. However, closer exami-
nation of the development situation in Vietnam at the time 
would suggest that other economic infrastructure and health 
initiatives would have been more appropriate.
•  Sweden’s support for Doi Moi from 1986 onwards was fully 
consistent with the pressing needs of the economy running 
into trouble with low growth and productivity and when 
income poverty was extremely high.
•  The shifts in emphasis of Swedish development co-operation 
with Vietnam in the period from 1999 to 2011 were fully 
consistent with the need for improvements in human rights, 
democracy and government accountability.
•  Sweden’s Chia Se Poverty Alleviation programme provided 
a more direct approach to poverty reduction by a combina-
tion of participatory methods, transparency, and a decen-
tralised approach to collective decision-making.
Sri Lanka
 There appears to be a high degree of consistency between Swed-
ish development co-operation with Sri Lanka and the Sri Lankan 
Government’s development priorities for the period up to 2004. 
The same cannot be said for the period after 2004, given the 
focus of development co-operation on peace and democracy.
•  Evidence suggests that support for family planning and tack-
ling disadvantage in the plantation sector were the most suc-
cessful activities from a poverty reduction perspective and 
were fully consistent with and supported by government pri-
orities.
•  After 2004 Sweden did not engage with or support govern-
ment priorities. Instead it supported civil society groups, 
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with the aim of increasing their capacity to engage in the 
peace and democracy process.
2.  To what extent has Sida’s development co-opera-
tion programme been effectively and efficiently 
delivered?
Laos
 The evidence of effective and efficient delivery of Swedish devel-
opment co-operation in Laos is mixed.
•  Evidence of effective and efficient aid delivery is scarcest 
during the first phase of development co-operation, between 
1974 and 1985. There is evidence of significant tying of its 
aid, of a lack of harmonisation among donors and, in partic-
ular, of very limited capacity to efficiently absorb aid inflows 
for development purposes.
•  However, had Sweden not been as active a donor as it was in 
the first phase, it would not have established an important 
prerequisite for later effective development co-operation in 
Laos. That prerequisite is to be seen as a trusted, long-term 
development co-operation partner.
•  The second and third phases of development co-operation 
between Sweden and Laos, between the years 1986 and 
1996 and 1996 and 2010, respectively, saw much more effec-
tiveness and efficiency in aid delivery. Aid tying was phased 
out; there was strong alignment with Government of Laos 
priorities, clear and seemingly effective attempts at harmoni-
sation of donor activities and consistency between activities 
on the ground and the Swedish country program.
•  The fact that Laos: (a) achieved strong multidimensional 
development and poverty outcomes since the 1990s; (b) 
received high levels of aid with steady year-on-year increases; 
and (c) directed development co-operation towards its most 
important development needs is pleasing from a develop-
ment perspective. While alone they clearly do not provide 
sufficient evidence that aid to Laos has been effective, they 
are consistent with development effectiveness principles. 
Added to these findings are the results of a simple statistical 
analysis that pointed to positive associations between human 
development achievements in Laos and the total amounts of 
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aid it has received from the international donor community. 
The last three findings are not consistent with effective aid, 
and suggest that one should be cautious in causally linking 
the improved multidimensional development outcomes in 
Laos to the aid it has received, these associations notwith-
standing.
Vietnam
 The evidence of effective and efficient delivery of Swedish devel-
opment co-operation in Vietnam is mixed.
•  Evidence of effective and efficient delivery is scarcest during 
the first phase of development co-operation. While it seems 
that Sida’s priorities were aligned with those of the Vietnam-
ese government, there is evidence of significant aid tying. 
There is also evidence of a lack of capacity in the health sec-
tor, which adversely impacted on the effectiveness of Swed-
ish support to that sector.
•  The second and third phases clearly saw much more effec-
tive and efficient Swedish aid delivery in Vietnam. There 
was strong Vietnamese government ownership of the activi-
ties supported by Sida. Also these activities were very closely 
aligned to Vietnamese government priorities.
•  With the exception of the finding regarding proliferation 
and fragmentation, the quantitative findings presented in 
Table 2.3 paint an optimistic view of development effective-
ness in the country.
Sri Lanka
 There is strong evidence that on balance the Swedish develop-
ment co-operation programme with Sri Lanka has been efficient-
ly delivered.
•  Prior to 2004, there appears to have been a high degree of 
alignment with Sri Lankan government priorities and, to 
this extent, a commensurate degree of local ownership. 
There is also evidence of harmonisation with other donors. 
However this did deteriorate after 2004.
•  From 2004 onwards, there is evidence that capacity among 
civil society organisations was built but the overall focus on 
peace and democracy was at odds with partner government 
ownership and alignment.
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•  The evaluation analysis also raised questions concerning the 
capacity of civil society to absorb and effectively utilise high 
aid flows; a serious question because a sizeable proportion of 
Swedish aid has been delivered through these organisations 
since the early to mid-2000s.
3.  How and to what extent did Sida’s development  
co-operation nurture an enabling environment 
for poverty reduction?
Laos
 There is clear evidence that after a slow start Sida’s development 
co-operation nurtured such an environment in Laos, or put dif-
ferently assisted in the pre-conditions for sustained poverty reduc-
tion.
•  Key elements in nurturing an enabling environment are 
local government capacity and removing impediments to 
poor people acting in a way that improves their living stand-
ards. Swedish support for governance and improved public 
administration has been successful, as has support for the 
National University of Laos and the State Statistical Centre. 
The benefits of this support are many and include better 
pro-poor service delivery, greater mobilisation of domestic 
revenues and a better evidence base for policy development 
and implementation. All of these benefits are conducive to 
greater poverty reduction and sustained development out-
comes into the future.
•  Support for provincial road construction has been important 
in enabling poor people to have better market and health 
services access, which is vital to improve their living condi-
tions.
Vietnam
 There is clear evidence that Sida’s development co-operation nur-
tured such an environment in Vietnam, or put differently, that it 
assisted in the pre-conditions for sustained poverty reduction.
•  This is strongly demonstrated by Swedish support for Doi 
Moi.
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Sri Lanka
 There is clear evidence that Sida’s development co-operation nur-
tured such an environment for poverty reduction in Sri Lanka.
•  Reducing fertility does not itself constitute poverty reduc-
tion, but it does enable an environment in which better 
health and education levels can be achieved and income 
poverty can be reduced. There is strong evidence to suggest 
that the declines in fertility in Sri Lanka from the late 1950s 
were higher than otherwise would have been the case had 
Sweden not worked with the Government of Sri Lanka in 
the area of family planning.
•  Sweden effectively built the capacity of various civil society 
actors in the area of peace and democracy. Further there is 
evidence that Sweden contributed to an enabling environ-
ment for poverty reduction amongst the Indian Tamil com-
munity by improving access to education.
4.  What lessons can be learned from Sweden’s devel-
opment co-operation with the country to improve 
development effectiveness in the future?
Laos
 There are three main lessons learned from the evaluation of 
Swedish development co-operation with Laos:
1.  Adopt a long-term approach, developing a sound relation-
ship with the partner government that facilitates frank and 
open dialogue;
2.  Pursue an effective balance between principles and pragma-
tism; and
3.  Be flexible and learn while doing.
 These are generic lessons for aid delivery, applying to both bilat-
eral and multilateral co-operation. While they apply primarily to 
donors, they also provide important insights for partner country 
governments in their dealings with donors, in particular the first 
lesson.
Vietnam
 There are three lessons learned, which if acted upon can improve 
future development effectiveness. These are:
1.  To recognise the importance of relationships;
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2.  To adopt a long term approach – pursue an effective balance 
between principles and pragmatism; and
3.  Be flexible and open to new ideas.
Sri Lanka
 There are a number of lessons that Sweden and other donors can 
learn from this assessment of Sweden’s aid to Sri Lanka over 53 
years. The most salient lessons are:
1.  Adopt a long-term approach;
2.  Have a principal-led approach, but also be pragmatic; and
3.  To be flexible and to understand the drivers of intended out-
comes.
2.4 RESPonSE To ThE PRIMARy 
EVALuATIon QuESTIon
The primary evaluation question – how, and to what extent, did Sida’s 
development assistance contribute to poverty reduction in a particular country – is 
rarely easy to answer for any development co-operation program.
The response from each Evaluation was as follows.
Laos
Aid levels to Laos are relatively high by international standards, and 
certainly large enough relative to its population and the size of its 
economy to expect some relationship between these inflows and 
development achievements. Donors have, it seems, responded to 
important national development needs within Laos and have provid-
ed relatively steady year-on-year aid levels. In the period 1986 to 
2010 (Phases II and III in the description in the evaluation report), 
there also appears to have been co-ordination between donors, to 
the extent that a number of donors have harmonised their activities 
with those of Sweden. In addition, and fundamentally, there is clear 
evidence of solid gains in income poverty reduction, in health and 
education and in human development generally in Laos.
There is, however, evidence of poor donor practice in this aspect 
of harmonisation of Swedish aid delivery with other donors’ activi-
ties and there is no reason to believe that this has not also occurred 
with other donors. There is also evidence of a lack of local capacity 
to use aid efficiently, aid levels in excess of that which might be effi-
ciently absorbed, and increasing proliferation of aid activities in 
Laos.
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On balance, it is reasonable to posit that the overall development 
co-operation effort in Laos has contributed to poverty reduction: at 
the very least poverty levels would be higher in Laos in the absence 
of such co-operation.
Sweden’s effort needs to be judged in this context, but also against 
the evidence that its aid has been delivered effectively and efficiently 
and has addressed important development needs.
On these grounds it is entirely reasonable to conclude that Swed-
ish development co-operation has made a substantive contribution 
to poverty reduction in Laos.
Vietnam
The evidence examined in the evaluation points to Swedish develop-
ment co-operation with Vietnam having strong poverty reducing 
impacts.
While the exact extent to which Swedish development assistance 
has reduced poverty is a matter for broad estimation, it would 
appear to be beyond doubt that Sweden has worked with the Gov-
ernment of Vietnam to lift many millions of Vietnamese out of 
income poverty. The benefits of this assistance are almost certainly 
not limited to income dimension poverty alone, but to gains in other 
dimensions. It is a general rule, based on the findings of internation-
al research, that higher growth facilitates gains in health and educa-
tion. There is no reason to believe that this rule does not apply in 
Vietnam. It can reasonably be concluded, therefore, that Swedish 
development co-operation has improved the health, education and 
overall human development levels of millions of Vietnamese citizens.
Sri Lanka
This is an especially difficult question to answer for development co-
operation between Sweden and Sri Lanka.
Given that Swedish aid has constituted a relatively small share of 
total aid to Sri Lanka (no more than seven percent for any decade 
since 1960), it is highly unlikely that any poverty reduction recorded 
at a national level was due to Swedish aid. The only possible excep-
tion to this is Swedish aid during the period up to 1977, owing to its 
support for family planning.
Noting this possible exception, the most realistic conclusion is 
that Swedish aid contributed to the lowering of poverty at the mar-
gins. The precise extent of this contribution remains a matter of esti-
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mation. The available evidence is consistent with having made such 
a difference up to 2002, largely due to its support for the plantation 
sector, which was a successful intervention that had meaningful mul-
tidimensional poverty reducing impacts for this segment of the pop-
ulation. It appears questionable in the extreme whether such a dif-
ference was made between 2003 and 2010, when some capacity was 
built in the civil society sector but this had no impact on the most 
pressing development issue of the day (reducing the ongoing conflict) 
as political and historical events essentially swept away Sweden’s 
efforts in that regard.
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3. Evaluation Study Findings: 
A Synthesis
3.1 InTRoDuCTIon
This chapter provides a synthesis of the findings arising from the 
country programme level evaluations. It commences with a compar-
ative analysis of the relative achievements of Sweden’s long term 
development co-operation with Vietnam, Laos and Sri Lanka. This 
analysis culminates in a reconsideration of key lessons learned from 
the three evaluations, in a comparative context, before enunciating 
the drivers of success for long term development co-operation based 
on these lessons. Building on this analysis the chapter then addresses 
each of the six guiding questions introduced in Chapter 1.
3.2 EVALuATIon FInDIngS In 
A CoMPARATIVE ConTExT
The original country programme level evaluation studies did not 
attempt to compare the degrees of success of the three development 
co-operation programmes against the multidimensional poverty 
reduction criterion. Nor did it seek to compare performance using the 
Aid Quality Evaluation Framework (AQEF), which was developed 
specifically for that evaluation. Each evaluation was a discrete study 
in this sense. Upon reflection, however, it became obvious to Sida 
that a comparative analysis would be useful and could highlight some 
meaningful aspects about Sweden’s long term development co-opera-
tion in general, as well as suggesting some criteria that may inform 
future decisions regarding the phasing out, continuation and even the 
commencement of what might become a programme of long term 
development co-operation. The fact that a consistent framework and 
approach was used in each country makes this comparison possible.
When comparing the three development co-operation pro-
grammes, it is clear that the most successful was with Vietnam, 
a country that Sweden developed very close and special ties with 
over a 45 year period. Sweden’s decision to support Vietnam with 
aid during the Second Indo-Chinese War was the foundation stone 
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of this relationship. As the evaluation findings suggest, the early 
years of this co-operation programme were problematic, particular-
ly the Bai Bang Paper Mill and Hanoi children’s hospital projects. 
Neither project was entirely consistent with the most pressing devel-
opment priorities of the time: the hospital project gave insufficient 
attention to capacity building and the need for improved primary 
health care, and the Bai Bang Paper Mill Project was the subject of 
a number of criticisms, including cost over-runs. However both pro-
jects were based upon requests for support by the Vietnamese Gov-
ernment and therefore gave Sweden the opportunity to demonstrate 
solidarity with Vietnam during a very difficult period of Vietnamese 
history, and in so doing provided the foundation for the long and 
productive relationship that followed.
This relationship saw Sweden provide (from 1986 onwards) high-
ly strategic support for Vietnam’s Doi Moi programme of economic 
reform, which contributed to lifting many millions of Vietnamese 
out of poverty. Sweden was very well placed to provide this impor-
tant support, as it maintained a continual presence in Vietnam dur-
ing and after the Second Indo-Chinese War, when many other West-
ern countries supported the American-led embargo of the country, 
which only ended in 1993. This commitment was very well received 
by the Government of Vietnam. Swedish support was influential in 
a number of ways, not the least of which was the Vietnamese Gov-
ernment’s respect for the Swedish model of capitalism. The non-pre-
scriptive nature of Swedish support was also important, as it allowed 
the Vietnamese to develop their own economic model of reform 
without undue external interference. The review of Sweden’s support 
to reform demonstrated how this approach was much appreciated by 
senior Vietnamese counterparts.
The special relationship also enabled Sweden to engage with Viet-
nam in particularly sensitive areas such as human rights, anti-cor-
ruption and the media. In the 2000s this culminated in innovative 
support for the Chia Se Poverty Reduction Program, which institut-
ed grassroots democratic planning processes, and in the programme 
of partner driven co-operation, which, having built on the enduring 
relations between Swedish and Vietnamese institutions, represents, in 
the Evaluation Team’s view, a sustainable model of co-operation that 
will persist after development co-operation ceases in 2013.
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There is also very strong evidence of close alignment between 
Swedish development co-operation priorities and those of the Viet-
namese government. Above all, the evaluation of Sweden’s develop-
ment co-operation with Vietnam pointed to the importance of part-
nering for effective development aid, with the latter being condition-
al on the former. Indeed, if there is a dominant finding from the 
evaluations, one that stands above all others, it is the importance of 
the relationship between the partner and donor governments for 
effective development co-operation.
There are some similarities between Sweden’s development co-
operation with Vietnam and that with Laos and Sri Lanka. The 
most obvious is the long-term nature of the co-operation, and the 
fact that it straddled many different phases of the political and eco-
nomic development of each country. Why where these other two 
development co-operation programmes less successful from a devel-
opmental, multidimensional poverty reduction perspective than the 
Vietnamese experience? There are numerous reasons for this, and 
many of them were largely independent of Swedish development co-
operation efforts and well beyond Sweden’s control. These include 
factors such as domestic politics, domestic policy, the relative impor-
tance of aid to economic growth and development, the developmen-
tal stage of each country, and the human resource capacity of the 
respective governments.
Confining our focus to those conditions over which Sweden had 
some control, there is one overarching reason for relatively poorer 
performance in Laos, and two reasons for relatively poor perfor-
mance in Sri Lanka. In Laos, after a relatively ineffective start, 
Swedish development co-operation began addressing pressing devel-
opment needs and aligned with local government priorities. Assis-
tance to the transport sector from the mid-1980s and support to 
developing statistics capacity was judged to be particularly effective 
in this regard. Yet limited local capacity to achieve development 
results constrained what Sweden could achieve in Laos. Sweden rec-
ognised this and began to effectively address it, but this was arguably 
too late. Strong capacity building activities earlier in the partnership 
would have produced a stronger outcome at the end. One could 
argue, however, that this focus on capacity (and other so-called ‘soft’ 
approaches to development) was not part of mainstream develop-
ment thinking in the early years of co-operation, where the focus in 
Laos and elsewhere was on ‘harder’ approaches. As can be seen from 
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the evaluation report, which outlined the history of Swedish projects 
in Laos, there was a noticeable evolution of Swedish support from 
‘hard’ to ‘soft’ over the period of co-operation. This evolution mir-
rored changes in international development thinking more generally.
The reasons why the programme with Sri Lanka was evidently less 
successful are inter-related. The first is reasonably obvious. Sweden 
addressed a number of pressing development needs in Sri Lanka and 
many of its efforts were efficiently and effectively delivered and were 
aligned with local government priorities. Its efforts to tackle disadvan-
tage in the Sri Lankan plantation sector were judged to be highly 
effective development assistance from a poverty reduction perspective. 
Yet, in the latter years, its development co-operation efforts were 
swept away by the on-going conflict and, in particular, the Sri Lankan 
government’s response to this conflict from the mid-2000s onward. 
Neither the Swedish government nor many civil society actors pre-
dicted that the conflict would be as aggressively tackled as it was.
The second reason is less obvious. In Vietnam and Laos, Sweden 
was able to assess the drivers of, and constraints to, development and 
multi-dimensional poverty reduction, and was able to move to 
address them in a relatively strategic and coherent manner. This 
arguably happened too late in Laos, given the slowness of Sweden to 
address local capacity development issues, which were a significant 
major constraint. But in Vietnam this adaptation was strategic and 
overarching, particularly from the late 1980s; and it focussed on the 
main game, which was economic reform. In Sri Lanka, Sweden did 
not appear to have a realistic appreciation of the determinants of 
conflict, nor did they have a sufficiently overarching strategy regard-
ing conflict resolution and development. With such an appreciation 
Sweden may have looked beyond building the capacity of local 
NGOs to push for peace, human rights and democratisation, and 
may have instituted more cross-cutting approaches earlier in the 
partnership. It should be remembered that Sweden was the first 
western donor to Sri Lanka and generally had good relations with 
the Government up to 2005. However a strategic and coherent poli-
cy in relation to conflict and development did not arise until many 
years after the initial large scale conflict with Tigers of Tamil Ealam 
in 1983. Sweden’s approach did not sufficiently address the ‘main 
game’ in Sri Lanka, which was clearly the ongoing conflict. Put 
more succinctly, Sweden did not sufficiently learn while doing and 
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did not find an appropriate balance between principles and pragma-
tism in Sri Lanka.
The preceding analysis draws, to a large extent, on both the 
characteristics of Swedish development co-operation with the three 
countries and the key lessons identified in each evaluation study. The 
lessons learned are not identical for each country but overlap to 
a large degree. From the lessons it is possible to extract the following 
drivers of successful development co-operation:
•  have a long-term approach;
•  be flexible and learn while doing;
•  be principle-led; be pragmatic; and
•  develop a good relationship with the partner government.
Table 3.1: Lessons Learned Reported in Evaluation Studies
Swedish 
Development 
Co-operation 
Programme
lessons learned
Vietnam 1.  To recognise the importance of relationships;
2.  To adopt a long term approach – and pursue an ef-
fective balance between principles and pragma-
tism; and
3.  Be flexible and open to new ideas.
Laos 1.  Adopt a long-term approach, developing a sound re-
lationship with the partner government that facili-
tates frank and open dialogue;
2.  Pursue an effective balance between principles and 
pragmatism; and
3.  Be flexible and learn while doing.
Sri Lanka 1.  Adopt a long-term approach;
2.  Have a principle-led approach, but also be prag-
matic; and
3.  Be flexible and to understand the drivers of intend-
ed outcomes.
A matrix can be constructed around these drivers, and assess-
ments have been made of the extent to which these drivers contrib-
uted to the success of the development co-operation programmes in 
Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Laos. The matrix is presented in Table 3.2. 
By way of explanation:
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•  four asterisks indicates that the driver influenced the pro-
gramme in an extremely positive way, helping it do achieve 
success;
•  three asterisks indicates that it contributed in a positive way;
•  two indicate a low degree of influence; and
•  one suggests it have been absent.
Thise assigning of asterisks is not the result of a formal analysis, but 
is impressionistic in nature, being based on the reflections of the 
team that undertook the original evaluations. They should be inter-
preted in this vein. The meaning of the drivers’ themes is reasonably 
self-evident from the preceding discussion, although some clarifica-
tion is required for the drivers described as ‘flexibility’ and ‘princi-
ple-led’. Flexibility should not be viewed as Sweden operating in 
a self-interested opportunistic manner, but as the ability to change 
what it is doing and respond to development conditions within the 
partner country. Sweden’s shift toward supporting Doi Moi in Viet-
nam is an example of flexibility. Principle-led development co-opera-
tion is acting in accordance with the donor’s own principles, such as 
a respect for human rights and democratisation, and not necessarily 
those of the partner government.
Table 3.2: Drivers of Success in Development Co-operation
Driver Swedish Development Co-operation Program
vietnam laos Sri lanka
Long-term Ap-
proach
**** **** ****
Flexibility **** **** ****
Learning While 
Doing
**** ** ** (up to 2005)
* (2005 onward)
Principle-led **** **** ****
Pragmatism **** **** **** (up to 2005)
* (2005 onward)
Good Relation-
ship with Part-
ner Government
**** *** ** (up to 2005)
* (2005 onward)
What is most striking from Table 3.2 is the relative absence of 
a good relationship with the Sri Lankan government, and in partic-
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ular the strained relationship with it from 2005. This coupled with 
the relatively low assessments regarding pragmatism and learning 
while doing, have been key determinants of the relatively low degree 
of success of the programme with Sri Lanka. What differentiates 
Vietnam is the extent to which success has been driven by the rela-
tionship between the Vietnamese and Swedish governments.
3.3 RESPonSES To guIDIng QuESTIonS
1.  Are there common features of Swedish develop-
ment co-operation with all three countries, 
besides the long-term approach?
The common features across all three countries, in addition to 
a long-term approach, are flexibility and the principle-led approach. 
These two drivers are given four asterisks in each country in Table 
3.2 above.
Flexibility, including openness to new ideas, is evident in the way 
Sweden approached a sector, implemented projects, responded to 
opportunities, and addressed challenges across the three countries. 
In this context, flexibility refers to the capacity to adapt programmes 
in response to changing development circumstances in a partner 
country. There are many examples of this throughout the three 
countries. The decision to move towards an explicit focus on poverty 
reduction and to support the Chia Se programme in Vietnam (as 
opposed to just continuing on with a less than desirable, but safer, 
rural development program) is a particularly poignant example of 
this. This demonstrated that Sida was not ‘path dependent’ in the 
rural development sector but willing to adapt to changing circum-
stances, and confront the institutional ‘stickiness’ that often comple-
ments long term sectoral support. Such an approach was also wit-
nessed in the Plantation Schools programme in Sri Lanka and the 
Roads programme in Laos, where significant reinventions of those 
sectors occurred due to the openness and flexibility of the Swedish 
approach. This could be referred to as ‘sectoral flexibility’. In this 
instance a donor is not leaving a sector per se but reshaping its 
approach to that sector.
Sida’s flexibility also extended to the implementation of pro-
grammes and projects within sectors. The history of the Swedish 
Agency of Research Cooperation (SAREC)-funded molecular biol-
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ogy project in Sri Lanka highlighted how a flexible approach to aid 
delivery, over a long period of time, is required when building capac-
ity in a developing country. The relatively non-prescriptive nature of 
Swedish support and the willingness to accept that unforeseen cir-
cumstances can disrupt timelines and affect outputs were important 
characteristics that contributed to the success of this project over 
time. This could be referred to as ‘implementation flexibility’. The 
capacity to be flexible in this regard largely stems from a thorough 
understanding of the situation on the ground and an inherent trust 
in the capacity of key individuals.
Flexibility and a willingness to consider new ideas are important 
to long-term development effectiveness. Without these characteris-
tics the trajectory of long-term development co-operation risks 
becoming ‘path dependent’ – a process whereby early decisions 
unduly shape and constrain subsequent choices. This inability to 
reshape programmes and modify partnership arrangements can 
have significant development effectiveness implications. As men-
tioned, the transition to Chia Se in Vietnam demonstrates that Swe-
den was not constrained by previous choices (in this case, the choice 
of partner agency) in the pursuit of new approaches. In fact, this case 
study demonstrates how Sweden was prepared to negotiate difficult 
political dynamics in order to proceed with an initiative that offered 
greater potential for effective multidimensional poverty reduction.
There is evidence that some of this willingness to adapt and mod-
ify programmes and sectors was influenced to a high degree by 
organisational learning. It is a perspective that emerges strongly 
from the case study of Sweden’s involvement in the roads sector in 
Laos. Regular evaluations played a key role in maintaining the focus 
on institutional development and driving refinement of the basic 
access component. The latter was particularly important in sharpen-
ing the poverty-reducing impact of the roads constructed. A range of 
analytical inputs commissioned by Sida at various stages facilitated 
an increasingly sophisticated approach to the institutional develop-
ment efforts. While not always successfully incorporated into prac-
tice, these efforts are indicative of a donor attempting to come to 
grips with emerging challenges.
If we review the above, it is evident that the capacity to be flexible 
and to adapt to changing circumstances in an appropriate and effec-
tive manner stems in part from having a strongly positive relation-
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ship with a recipient country, emphasising organisational learning, 
trying to understand the practical issues that face partners in devel-
oping countries, having realistic expectations (based on a thorough 
understanding of these practicalities) and trusting key partners. Hav-
ing a strongly positive relationship with the partner government was 
absent in Sri Lanka from the mid-2000s onward, and it is largely on 
this basis that this programme is judged by to be the least effective, 
(compared with Vietnam and Laos), in terms of the poverty reduc-
tion criterion on which the primary evaluation question is based.
The other common feature was the principle-led approach, 
which was present throughout the entire history of engagement in all 
countries. A set of core principles remained at the heart of Sweden’s 
approach from the commencement of development co-operation in 
these countries to the phase out. These principles were not always 
enshrined in policy but are evident in even some of the earliest docu-
mentation and policy stances. The decision to support family plan-
ning in Sri Lanka, which was a contentious issue at the time, is an 
early example of this. So too is the subsequent decision not to sup-
port the Sri Lankan government’s sterilization agenda. The most 
poignant example of this principle-led approach is, of course, the 
decision by the Swedish Government to support Vietnam with aid 
during the Second Indo-Chinese War.
Later examples of this included the determination to focus on the 
poor and marginalised in the Plantation sector in Sri Lanka, and the 
rights-based approach enshrined in the Global Policy for Develop-
ment, which manifested in support for civil society in Sri Lanka and 
democracy and human rights in Laos and Vietnam. Interviews with 
other donors and government officials from all three countries, con-
firm that Sweden was, by and large, viewed as a “progressive” donor, 
prepared to take a stand on issues such as human rights. Striking 
a balance was not always easy however. On the one hand, Sweden 
occupied a unique position among donors (particularly in Vietnam 
and Laos) and was able to raise politically sensitive issues. On the 
other, however, Sweden had arguably more to lose from pushing the 
limits of the ‘special relationship’. By this it is meant that a diplomatic 
fall out with Vietnam would be costly in terms of the damage it could 
do to Sweden’s international standing in diplomatic and other circles.
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2.  Are these features due to the length of stay in the 
country or could they have come about in other 
ways?
As the ‘principle-led’ and ‘flexibility’ features were evident at the 
highest levels in all three countries, it might be reasonable to posit 
that these are ubiquitous characteristics of Swedish aid more gener-
ally and by-products of the long term approach in which trust and 
mutual understanding were important. This interpretation is only 
partly true. The principle-led approach is a ubiquitous characteristic 
of Swedish aid that is not dependent purely on time. This feature is 
shaped by both institutional and cultural factors. The institutional 
factors include the policy stances of successive Swedish governments, 
and the subsequent conversion of policy into practice in areas like 
gender, the environment, poverty reduction and a rights-based 
approach. The evaluation reports in each country all recount exam-
ples of how policy stances within the Swedish parliament, or within 
Sida, translated to (sometimes significant) modifications of existing 
programmes, and reshaped country strategies.
The cultural factors underlying the principle-led approach 
include the individual and socio-cultural characteristics of Swedish 
representatives in the country, and the general ‘Swedish’ presence, 
which was associated with notions of progressiveness, political neu-
trality, fairness and openness. Many respondents commented on the 
importance of having a ‘Swedish’ presence in the country. If one 
considers the entire donor landscape in each country then it is clear-
ly very important to have a myriad of different donor philosophies 
and ‘personalities’, and it is from this perspective that many partner 
government officials lamented the phasing out of Swedish aid. This 
‘Swedish’ influence also extended to the model of Swedish capital-
ism, which a number of very high level economists from within the 
Vietnamese Communist Party mentioned contributed positively to 
their acceptance of market-based principles.
The flexibility feature may be less demonstrably ‘Swedish’, as it is 
dependent on a number of factors, including: a commitment to 
organisational learning (where new knowledge can inform the opti-
mal design of a program); the existence of a strong relationship 
(which is robust enough to allow for significant change without caus-
ing damage); and an understanding of what is practical and likely to 
succeed in a country given its political, social and economic configu-
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ration. A number of these factors (particularly the strong relation-
ship) are dependent on time, so the long term approach is important 
in that respect.
Institutions need to be open enough to consider new ideas, but to 
be effective they also need the capacity to act and adapt. In our view 
Sweden largely demonstrated this capacity in each of the three 
countries.
3.  What are the links between these features and the 
factors that have impeded or contributed to the 
success of Sweden’s development co-operation?
As information in Table 3.2 suggests, the principle-led approach and 
the demonstration of flexibility and openness were drivers of success 
in all three countries. There were, however, a number of factors that 
interacted with these features and affected the success of Sweden’s 
development co-operation in the three countries. One of the most 
obvious was the disjunction between Sweden’s principle-led 
approach in human rights and democracy and the political stances 
of the respective countries. This played itself out most starkly in Sri 
Lanka. In the latter years of co-operation, Sweden’s strident com-
mitment to democracy and human rights was in some respects 
responsible for the deterioration in relations between Sweden and Sri 
Lanka that was evident at the time of the embassy closing. In the 
Evaluation Team’s view Sweden (and indeed many other donors) 
failed to understand the immensity of the change in the political 
stance of the Government of Sri Lanka. This does not necessarily 
imply that co-operation with the Sri Lankan government should 
have ended sooner than it did, simply that the programme be tai-
lored to what could be realistically achieved in Sri Lanka at the 
time.
The deteriorating human rights situation in Sri Lanka, and the 
scaling up of the war effort and associated atrocities was an anathe-
ma to Sweden, which voiced its opinions on these issues in interna-
tional forums and provided direct support to civil society groups, 
virtually closing down dialogue with the government. This position 
was criticised by some donors who continued to work with the gov-
ernment directly, and who continue to do so in the peace and 
democracy space. If, as is argued (and demonstrated by the Vietnam 
experience), relationships matter to development effectiveness, then 
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it is clear that when a focussed commitment to principles changes 
the dynamics of donor-recipient relationship, then the success of 
development co-operation between the two countries will be com-
promised. The principle-led approach also played itself out in less 
overt ways in Laos and Vietnam, where Sweden had much more 
success engaging with those governments on sensitive matters. 
Clearly, in those countries there were not the overt conflict and 
human rights abuses that existed in Sri Lanka but there were never-
theless clear concerns within the Swedish government that the pace 
of reform was not quick enough.
As the evaluation reports highlighted, one of the major insights 
arising from the evaluations, particularly from the application of the 
evaluation framework, was the extent to which the Swedish model of 
development co-operation in the 1980s and 1990s demonstrated 
many of the characteristics and principles that would subsequently 
form part of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Ownership 
and alignment were particularly strong characteristics in this regard. 
This arose from the strong relationship between countries (which 
emphasised dialogue and the pursuit of agreed goals) and the flexible 
nature of Swedish aid delivery with its focus on poverty reduction 
and aligning with government priorities. Significant emphasis was 
also placed on conducting thorough studies on development chal-
lenges in all countries, and this high level analysis seems to have 
been reasonably well integrated into development strategies. Evi-
dence from the country-level evaluations suggests that as the aid 
effectiveness agenda increased in importance in the development 
sector, Sweden was looked upon as a leader in this regard, both with 
in-country partners and with like-minded donors and in many areas 
Sweden led the agenda.
4.  Depending on how well-placed a donor might be to 
achieving its developmental objectives in a coun-
try, what implications does a decision to phase out 
have on the sustainability of these achievements?
The following discussion about sustainability operates at two levels: 
the first relating to the sustainability and effectiveness of bilateral 
sectoral engagement and how this is affected when a trusted donor 
departs a sector; and the second to the more traditional notion of 
sustainability at the project or programme level.
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As mentioned throughout this report, one of the most significant 
findings arising from the three country-level evaluations is the 
important role donor-recipient relations plays in the effective deliv-
ery of aid. As the case of Sri Lanka suggests this is not just about 
long term engagement, although that is important. It is also about 
building a special relationship with a recipient country. As the case 
of Vietnam suggests the building of such a relationship requires sig-
nificant political support, as well as strategic, but non-prescriptive 
development co-operation in high priority sectors. An example of 
this was Sweden’s strategic support to the Doi Moi reforms over 
a long period of time in Vietnam.
These relationships are not easily replaced or substituted (as they 
are built on political and social capital), and when a donor with such 
a strong relationship phases out development co-operation with 
a recipient country we would expect the aggregate level of aid effec-
tiveness to reduce, particularly in those sectors where that relation-
ship was strong and where the donor had significant influence. This 
arises because a special relationship allows for a much more strategic 
approach in sensitive and priority areas than would be expected in 
its absence. This may include influencing policy and legislative 
change at the national level, which, as is well known, is an important 
driver of sustainability as it may support programme and project lev-
el outcomes. Clearly an inability to influence policy makers at 
a national level can affect the sustainability of achievements. In some 
respects all donors operating in a sector can benefit from a special 
relationship if that relationship can be used to influence the develop-
ment of high level policy or legislation that supports achievements in 
that sector.
The example of the media sector in Vietnam is a good case in 
point. Sweden has been the sectoral lead in this area for a long time 
and had developed a lot of trust with the relevant government minis-
try, and with many journalists and media professionals throughout 
Vietnam. Upon Sweden’s departure from this space there was some 
speculation that the United Kingdom would lead the donor effort in 
this area, but it was clear from the data collected that Sweden’s 
departure could not be easily replaced, and that it would take much 
time indeed for another donor to operate as effectively in that space 
occupied by Sweden. The same applies, perhaps even to a greater 
degree, to other donor efforts to assume Sweden’s lead role in anti-
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corruption in Vietnam. There were a number of examples about 
how sectoral effectiveness will be affected by Sweden’s departure. 
This was most evident in Laos and Vietnam.
In line with the above rationale, it is reasonable then to assert 
that the sustainability of Sweden’s achievements in each country 
may well be affected by their own departure, particularly in those 
sectors where it was an influential partner. This is why it is impor-
tant from an aid effectiveness perspective to ensure that another 
influential donor can succeed a ‘special’ donor upon their departure. 
It is accepted that this may just not be possible in some countries due 
to the country’s history or the limited nature of such relationships. 
A new lead donor may not have the same influence as the departed 
donor but every effort should be made to ensure that there is an 
opportunity for this donor to operate as effectively as possible in this 
space, and this may involve some sort of succession planning. If the 
special relationship-effectiveness-sustainability hypothesis is fol-
lowed through to its logical conclusion then it would suggest that the 
donor with the best relationship in each sector should lead support in 
that sector, influencing high level decision-making on behalf of all 
other donors and thus improving the aggregate conditions for sus-
tainability; we appreciate however, that politics, in-country donor 
capacity, and recipient country decision-making structures may pre-
clude this from happening.
For these reasons, it can be suggested that the decision to phase 
out development co-operation should be founded on an appreciation 
of the depth and breadth of the relationship between the donor and 
recipient, and after an analysis of the strengths of that relationship 
has been undertaken. In those countries where a strong, productive 
or ‘special’ relationship, exists serious consideration should be given 
to not phasing out co-operation. This is not to say that the donor 
should necessarily remain in the country, just that a possible phasing 
out requires particularly careful analysis given the importance of 
relationship for development effectiveness. This relationship analysis 
could be complemented by poverty and governance (corruption, 
form of governance and so on) variables in a decision-making matrix 
that could be used to prioritise countries to be phased out (or other-
wise), if that is the political requirement. Such an analysis should be 
a transparent approach to decision-making in this area and would 
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highlight the nexus between the diplomatic and development 
domains in Swedish foreign policy.
5.  What do the evaluations say in terms of Sweden’s 
involvement in one-party states and the effective-
ness of its contributions?
One of the most interesting findings from the comparative evalua-
tion is that the most effective development co-operation was between 
Sweden and the two one-party states, namely Vietnam and Laos. 
Much of this was because of the strong relationship that existed 
between Sweden and these two countries, but there were also other 
important factors. For example, if we look at the results of the AQEF 
analysis we can see that aid from all donors has had the biggest 
impact in Vietnam, where the government has strong ownership of 
the development agenda, as would be expected in a one-party state. 
Vietnam also has significantly more capacity to implement its devel-
opment agenda compared to Laos for example, and much less politi-
cal disruption and internal conflict than Sri Lanka has had since 
1983. As our analysis suggested, aid to Vietnam (from all donors) 
was more effective than aid to the other two countries, and Sweden’s 
aid was itself very effective because of the special relationship, and 
the strategic nature of the development co-operation.
This may not be the place to discuss the developmental benefits 
of democracies versus one-party states, but it is clear from this small 
sample that Sweden’s support to Vietnam was clearly the most effec-
tive in reducing poverty. Much of this poverty reduction arose from 
the significant changes to the economy that accompanied the Doi 
Moi reforms. As such we may suggest that the combination of state 
control and planning capacity coupled with economic reforms has 
acted to significantly reduce poverty in Vietnam. This is undoubted-
ly one of the reasons why Vietnam has been heavily supported by 
the international donor community – it converts aid funds into 
achievements. Interesting further research could include assessing 
the effectiveness and poverty reducing impact of aid to one-party 
states that have adopted a reform agenda and comparing it with 
‘democracies’, which in some places are democracies in name only. 
The main consideration should perhaps not be a political one but 
more of a focus on improving the capacity of states to own their 
development agenda and supporting them to do so.
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A nagging question that emerges from the evaluations, and the 
synthesis of their findings, is whether Swedish development co-oper-
ation is more effective in one-party than multi-party states. The rea-
soning behind this question is twofold. First, it is easier to develop 
a relationship over time if the governing party does not change. Sec-
ond, one-party states tend to have longer-term priorities, thereby 
providing donors more time to align to these priorities, to learn and 
adapt. Relationships, a long term approach, learning by doing and 
the flexibility to adapt are all characteristics of Swedish aid and rea-
sons for its success in Vietnam and Laos. To conclude on these 
grounds that Swedish development co-operation is more effective in 
one-party states than others would be premature and inappropriate. 
What is not inappropriate, however, is to call for analytical and 
empirical work that provides a greater understanding of relation-
ships in a development co-operation context.
6.  What lessons learned from Sweden’s long-term co-
operation can be of use when a conflict arises in 
a country with which it is engaged in long-term 
development co-operation?
The lessons from the Sri Lankan evaluation suggest that for those 
donors who adopt a principle-led approach to development, and seek 
to contribute to resolving conflict, then significant attention needs to 
be paid to determining the exact nature of the social and political 
factors that underlie conflict in order to design interventions that 
address its underlying causes. Sweden was the first western donor in 
Sri Lanka, but it did not develop a coherent approach to conflict and 
development until many years after the initial significant conflict 
between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers in 
1983. The failure to do this is in some respects another example of 
how development thinking has evolved over time; the conflict per-
spective is a relatively late addition to development thinking within 
donor agencies, and it is difficult to blame Sweden for not adopting 
this perspective when it simply did not exist. The fact nevertheless 
remains that Sweden could have adopted a more mainstreamed and 
cross-cutting approach to conflict and development much earlier on 
(especially in the late 1990s when the conflict perspective started to 
infiltrate Swedish designs and strategies). This could have included 
community-based approaches to conflict resolution and the incorpo-
ration of conflict as a cross-cutting theme within development pro-
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grammes more generally. However, it is recognised that this sugges-
tion is relatively easy to make in retrospect.
Understanding the drivers of conflict is particularly important as 
it may help pre-empt future conflicts; significant time and resources 
should be spent ensuring that Sweden has a good appreciation of 
these drivers. As the Sri Lankan evaluation report suggested, Swe-
den’s support to the Plantation Schools Sector helped contribute to 
improving the quality of life of Indian Tamils. The Sri Lankan 
report discussed the importance of this support from a poverty 
reducing perspective but also mentioned the importance support like 
this played in reducing the chances of conflict arising from the eco-
nomic and social marginalisation experienced by Indian Tamils. 
This interpretation has been supported by Sri Lanka political scien-
tists and included as a rationale in later Swedish designs. In this case 
Sweden’s commitment to support the most economically marginal-
ised subset of the Sri Lankan population may have contributed to 
pre-empting conflict. In countries with a Swedish presence, where 
latent conflict resides, similar attention should be paid to addressing 
those factors that may contribute to the outbreak of conflict.
One of the other important insights arising from the Sri Lankan 
evaluation was the relative lack of disruption the escalating conflict 
had on the development co-operation strategies of other donors com-
pared to Sweden, which after 2005 made conflict resolution the cen-
trepiece of its development co-operation strategy. This reflected the 
strong principle-led approach adopted by Sweden. Unlike the 
Swedes and Norwegians, many other donors (particularly those that 
followed a more technical agenda) did not prioritise the conflict in 
their development co-operation, or take it upon themselves to direct-
ly confront the government about the escalating civil war, and they 
certainly did not resort to directly funding peace and democracy 
civil society organisations. Sweden and Norway did so out of princi-
ple, and while it affected the development co-operation relationship 
with the Government of Sri Lanka, it is difficult to see what else 
a ‘principle-led’ donor could do in this circumstance. In fact it could 
be argued that in the changing world of development co-operation, 
and given the rise of non-traditional donors, such principle-led 
stances are an important part of the donor landscape. In this envi-
ronment, donors such as Sweden would do well to develop a compre-
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hensive appreciation of the donor landscape in conflict afflicted 
countries in order to better understand the scope for influence.
3.4 ChAPTER SuMMARy
This chapter synthesised the findings arising from the country pro-
gramme level evaluations, by providing a comparative analysis of 
the relative achievements of Sweden’s long term development co-
operation with Vietnam, Laos and Sri Lanka. This analysis culmi-
nated in a reconsideration of key lessons learned from the three eval-
uations, in a comparative context, before enunciating the drivers of 
success for long term development co-operation based on these les-
sons.
The chapter then turned to its principal task, which was the pro-
vision of responses to each of the six guiding questions introduced in 
Chapter 1.
Two issues touched on in the chapter are worthy of further com-
ment. The first concerns relationships, which are considered a key 
factor determining the effectiveness of development co-operation. 
Greater understanding of this issue is warranted. While the provi-
sion of such understanding is beyond the terms of reference for this 
report, some further comments on this matter will be made in Chap-
ter 5, the conclusion.
It can be suggested that the decision to phase out development 
co-operation should be founded on an appreciation of the depth and 
breadth of the relationship between the donor and recipient, and 
after an analysis of the strengths of that relationship has been under-
taken. In countries where a strong, productive or ‘special’ relation-
ship exists, serious consideration should be given to not phasing out 
co-operation. This relationship variable could be complemented by 
poverty and governance (corruption, form of governance, etc.) vari-
ables in a decision-making matrix which could be used to prioritise 
countries to be phased out (or otherwise), if that is the political 
requirement. This type of analysis could be a transparent approach 
to decision-making in this area and would highlight the nexus 
between the diplomatic and development domains in Swedish for-
eign policy. We return to this complex issue below, in Chapter 4.
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4.1 InTRoDuCTIon
A decision to stay in or phase out of a country will inevitably be made 
on a range of developmental and non-developmental criteria. Devel-
opmental criteria – those relating to the promotion of living standards 
in recipient countries – might receive a low weighting in decisions. 
This is not without validity as donor governments have a responsibility 
to take into account many often competing considerations relating to 
broader foreign policy and domestic economic and political considera-
tions. Yet even if developmental criteria are ignored in deciding to stay 
in or phase out of a country, knowledge of the development implica-
tions of the chosen decision is needed so that the developmental oppor-
tunity costs of phasing out or remaining in a country can be appraised.
This chapter turns to the principal task addressed by the synthe-
sis report: to provide some general criteria that can inform the deci-
sion-making process with regard to the phasing out (or otherwise) of 
development co-operation in partner countries. The criteria are in 
the form of six questions that can be asked about any donor develop-
ment co-operation programme with a partner country. The chapter 
then considers a systematic, total aid programme wide, application 
of these questions.
4.2 STAyIng oR goIng: KEy QuESTIonS
The donor country decision to end or continue development co-
operation with a given partner should firstly address a number of 
focusing questions. Concentrating purely on developmental issues, 
the first and most fundamental question is as follows:
1.  What are the principal, over-riding developmental 
objectives of the development co-operation pro-
gramme with the partner country?
Donors tend to have a hierarchy of objectives in country pro-
grammes. Objectives also can change over time. Yet in most or 
4. Phasing out or Remaining: 
Towards general Decision 
Making Criteria
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many cases there will be an overall objective that will be constant 
over time. Typically it will be the achievement of sustainable devel-
opment and/or poverty reduction. To many donors these objectives 
are indivisible. Donors can also impose an over-riding objective even 
if it has not been pursued explicitly or consciously in a country pro-
gram. The bottom line, however, is that donors do need to ask them-
selves what they want to see achieved in the partner country if they 
are to make informed decisions as to the continuation of their pro-
gram. Note that this objective is framed in a way that it is not neces-
sarily what the donor itself wants to achieve, but what the donor 
wants to happen in the partner country per se. This distinction is 
explained more below.
In what follows we shall assume the over-riding objective is multi-
dimensional poverty reduction in the partner country, which was the 
criterion used to evaluate the above mentioned evaluation reports, 
those of development-co-operation with each of Laos, Sri Lanka and 
Vietnam.
Having determined what the over-riding objectives of the country 
programme are, the next question to address is as follows:
2.  To what extent have these objectives been 
achieved?
Answering this question requires an evaluation of the multi-
dimensional poverty-reducing impact of the country program. This 
evaluation needs to go further than concluding whether the donor 
development co-operation programme with the partner in question 
has reduced poverty, given that a decision is to be made about end-
ing or continuing this program. The evaluation could consider 
whether poverty in its key dimensions has been eradicated in the 
partner country in question. This would, however, be an unrealistic 
criterion given that poverty in one dimension or another exists in 
most if not all donor countries. A more appropriate criterion is 
whether the partner country is on a path to sustained poverty reduc-
tion, in which it has gained the ability to reduce poverty with its own 
resources. Put differently, the criterion is that the partner country 
can achieve further sustained poverty reduction without develop-
ment co-operation support from donor countries. Donors withdraw-
ing from some partners that have achieved middle income is broadly 
consistent with this criterion.
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If the answer to this question is a clear yes, then there is an obvi-
ous developmental case for phasing out development co-operation 
with the partner country in question. The phasing out need not be 
immediate, with a rapid winding back of the level of development 
co-operation. A gradual, staged phasing out could be introduced 
that commences with changes in the types of aid that are provided 
to the country. Such changes could occur even if the donor decides 
to remain in the country but withdraws from support to that sector 
for any reason.
An interesting characteristic of this question is that the donor in 
question need not have contributed to putting the partner on a path 
to self-sustaining sustained poverty reduction through its own 
resources. Yet for reasons that will become clear below, the evalua-
tion will, however, need to establish whether the donor has been able 
to contribute to this outcome.
If the answer to the second question is that the partner country 
does not have the ability to achieve sustained poverty reduction 
without the assistance of donors, or, put differently, that the donor 
objectives for the country have not been fully achieved, the following 
question needs to be addressed.
3.  If these objectives have not been fully achieved, is 
there any potential for them to be achieved by the 
donor in question?
Addressing this question requires an understanding of the drivers 
of success. For instance, in the case of Sri Lanka, assuming that the 
principal reason why Sweden wanted to see an end to violent conflict 
in that country was so that it could be put back on a path to sus-
tained multidimensional poverty reduction, this required an under-
standing of the drivers of conflict eradication and which of these 
drivers Sweden could realistically influence. The above mentioned 
evaluation, that on which staying or going decisions are based, 
should be able to inform the answer to this question. Key among 
these drivers, as alluded to above in Chapter 3, is the relationship 
between the donor and partner country. As also alluded to in that 
chapter, a transparent matrix type approach could be used to inform 
answers to question 3.
If the answer to question 3 is no, then a developmental case for 
phasing out is provided. But a yes to the answer does not necessarily 
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provide a case for staying. If the answer is yes, the following question 
then needs to be addressed, again with the assistance of an evalua-
tion.
Questions regarding time also need to be factored into the 
response to question 3. A donor might decide that while there is 
potential for the objectives to be achieved, the time frame for doing 
this might be deemed to be too long. Precisely the length of which 
might be considered to be too long is a matter over which the donor 
would have to exercise considerable judgment. There would appear 
to be no hard and fast rules that can be applied to this issue. Similar 
judgments are required of the volume of funds required to achieve 
the objectives in question.
4.  If they are not achieved, what is the likelihood of 
the donor group that remains in the partner coun-
try achieving them?
This question arose directly in the evaluations of Swedish devel-
opment co-operation with Laos and Vietnam. Swedish support for 
improving statistics capacity in Laos was very favourably evaluated, 
with it being considered to be a case of effective development co-
operation. Concerns were expressed, however, of the sustainability 
of the progress in building this capacity, given a perceived inability 
of the authorities in Laos to conduct analytical statistical work with-
out Swedish support. This is presumably an area in which other 
donors can step in where Sweden has stepped out. This was not, 
however, the case with Swedish work on reducing corruption and 
addressing human rights issues in Vietnam. This work is highly sen-
sitive, and there were real concerns that other donors did not have 
the type of relationship with the Vietnamese government that Swe-
den had in order to take this work forward. Had this work been the 
prime focus of Swedish development co-operation with Vietnam, 
and that reducing corruption and improving human rights were pre-
requisites for achieving sustained poverty reduction, then this would 
have provided a strong (necessary, but not sufficient) developmental 
case for Sweden staying as a donor in Vietnam.
If the answer to question 4 is that the likelihood of donors that 
stay is limited, then combined with a yes to question 3, a case for 
staying is provided. But it is only a partial case, as is now explained.
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4.3 STAyIng oR goIng: TowARDS 
A SySTEMATIC APPRoACh
A donor decision to engage or not to engage in development co-
operation with a developing country is not made in a vacuum. No 
donor engages in development co-operation with only one partner 
country. Donors have a suite of partner countries and decisions 
about phasing out of any one need to be determined in a relative 
context, taking into account information about all programmes with 
partners. If the questions are asked of a sub-set of the co-operation 
programmes of the donor in question, it could be the donor remains 
in a number of countries in which its aid is having no positive devel-
opment impact. Taxpayer money is wasted as a result, and the 
donor’s overall aid programme is achieving sub-optimal results. It 
follows that the questions should in principle be asked of all of the 
partner country development co-operation programmes of the 
donor in question. If this is not feasible in practice, then it needs to 
be asked of those in which the donor has a substantive engagement 
in a budgetary sense.
Such an exercise requires a systematic approach to “staying or 
going” decisions that involves more than asking the above questions 
about each partner country program. It is not beyond the realms of 
possibility that the answers to these questions for every partner pro-
gramme under consideration would tell the donor to stay in each, 
despite broader considerations dictating that the donor has to reduce 
the number of partner countries. These considerations could be 
budgetary, with there being a perceived need to reduce the size of 
the donor’s total aid spending, or they could reflect a desire on devel-
opment efficiency grounds to reduce the number of country pro-
grammes by reducing donor proliferation, duplication of effort with 
other donors and so on. Alternatively, it might be the case that on 
these considerations the asking of these questions would result in 
responses that would dictate that the donor stay in too many coun-
tries.
What is required is some way of ranking programmes with part-
ner countries in terms of how strong the case is for staying. That is, 
for all countries in which the answers to the above questions would 
indicate the donor should stay, a ranking among them would need to 
be developed. Such a ranking could be derived using qualitative and 
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quantitative methods. The strength of the positive response to ques-
tion 3, which focuses on the drivers of successful development co-
operation, is central to this analysis. Indeed, the ranking could be 
developed in answering question 3, and as such also used to identify 
programmes for which the answer is in the negative, indicating 
phasing out.
One way a ranking could be achieved has been alluded to above, 
in Chapter 3. That is, the ranking could be founded on an apprecia-
tion of the depth and breadth of the relationship between each donor 
and the recipient, and after an analysis of the strengths of relation-
ships has been undertaken. And as noted above this type of analysis 
could provide a transparent approach to decision-making in this 
area and would highlight the nexus between the diplomatic and 
development domains in Swedish foreign policy. It would involve 
a nuanced, vertical discussion of the development co-operation pro-
grammes under consideration involving a broad range of donor 
stakeholders, including those working in each partner country. This 
is not to say that the analysis would provide purely diplomatic assess-
ments, but simply be cognisant of the importance of diplomacy for 
achieving development results.
Another approach would involve an adaptation of the aid alloca-
tion models used by the multilateral development banks, most nota-
bly the World Bank International Development Assistance (IDA) 
resource allocation system. This system is used to allocate IDA aid 
funds in a transparent, formulaic way among IDA-eligible low 
income countries. The amount of aid allocated to such a country is 
a decreasing function of its per capita income and an increasing 
function of an assessment of the quality of its development policies 
and performance of public institutions and its population size. 
A score is assigned to each recipient country by this system on the 
basis of these variables, and these scores are used to allocate 
amounts of IDA aid to them. This system could be adapted to stay or 
go decisions by replacing these variables with known drivers of the 
success of Swedish development assistance that are common to all 
recipients of this assistance, and having it produce a score that rather 
than allocates aid, determines whether Sweden stays or goes.
Part of any systematic approach to phasing out is an appropriate 
management plan. Once a decision to phase out development co-
operation with any one country is made, the actions in planning and 
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managing phase out are vital. A joint donor study5 in 2008 found 
that the critical factors for good exit management included 
actions to:
1. take communication seriously;
2. involve stakeholders;
3. set realistic timeframes;
4. respect legal obligations and commitments; and
5. be flexible.
Importantly, exit strategies that include these actions should be pre-
pared upon commencement of development co-operation with 
a partner country and then reviewed on a periodic basis.
4.4 CoMMEnCIng DEVELoPMEnT 
Co-oPERATIon
Donors do not only consider whether to stay in a partner country or 
phase out of it. They also make decisions to commence or re-com-
mence development co-operation with potential partner countries. 
The question outlined above can be adapted to this decision in 
a reasonably straightforward manner.
The adapted questions are as follows:
1.  What will be the principal, over-riding developmental objec-
tives of the development co-operation programme with the 
country?
2.  What is the likelihood of these objectives being achieved?
3.  Is there any potential for them to be achieved by the donor 
in question? and
4.  If they are not achieved, what is the likelihood of other 
donors currently in the partner country achieving them?
A decision to commence or re-commence would require yes or no 
responses to the second, third and fourth questions. As in staying or 
going decisions, the anticipated financial cost of and time involved in 
developing (or re-developing) a programme would have to be consid-
ered.
5 Managing Aid Exit and Transformation, Summary of a Joint Donor Evalu-
ation. 2008 Jointly commissioned by Sida, Norad, Danida and Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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If a donor is considering commencing or recommencing co-oper-
ation with more than one country, a systematic approach is needed. 
A ranking could be developed using either (or both) of the above 
mentioned approaches to entry and exit decisions, and these applied 
in a comparative way to those countries being considered.
4.5 ChAPTER SuMMARy
This chapter attempted to provide general developmental criteria to 
inform the decision-making process with regard to the phasing out 
of or continuing development co-operation with individual partner 
countries.
These criteria are in the form of questions that can be asked 
about any donor development co-operation programme with a part-
ner country. These questions principally turn on the developmental 
objectives that the donor has for the partner country in question.
In short, the questions hold that if these objectives are not yet but 
have the potential to be met, a prima facie case for staying in the 
country is provided. Whether the donor does stay, based purely on 
developmental criteria, depends on the relative extent of the case, 
judged across all partner country programmes.
The chapter then considered a systematic means by which “stay 
or go” decisions could be made, based on developmental criteria. 
This consideration was brief, and if a formal system for staying or 
going is to be used, considerable work would be required to develop 
it. To this extent the chapter’s discussion of such a system should be 
seen as no more than some basic preliminary thoughts.
The chapter ended with considering questions aimed at inform-
ing decisions to commence or re-commence development co-opera-
tion with potential partner countries. These questions also turn prin-
cipally on the objectives that a donor has for the partner countries in 
question.
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5.1 InTRoDuCTIon
The previous chapter attempted to provide general developmental 
criteria to inform the decision-making process with regard to the 
phasing out of or continuing development co-operation with individ-
ual partner countries. In this chapter we summarise the main con-
clusions of the report, as well as highlighting key issues that require 
further investigation.
5.2 MAIn ConCLuSIonS
Evaluation Report Findings
This report commenced by providing a summary of the main find-
ings of the evaluations of long-term Swedish development co-opera-
tion with Laos, Vietnam and Sri Lanka. It noted that these evalua-
tions concluded that each of these development co-operation pro-
grammes had experienced degrees of success. Each programme at 
various times and to varying degrees had responded to pressing 
development needs in the partner countries, had been effectively and 
efficiently delivered (although evidence of this was relatively scarce 
in the early years of co-operation with Laos and Vietnam) and had 
nurtured an enabling environment for poverty reduction. Co-opera-
tion with Vietnam was judged to have made a major contribution to 
poverty reduction, largely through its support for the Doi Moi eco-
nomic reforms. Co-operation with Laos was also judged to have 
made a contribution to poverty reduction in Laos, albeit to a lesser 
extent that in Vietnam. The contribution in Sri Lanka was consid-
ered at best to be at the margins. This was in large part due to a lack 
of success in Sri Lanka from the mid-2000s onward, in which the 
operating environment faced by donors was extremely difficult. It 
was especially difficult for Sweden owing to its focus on peace, pro-
motion of human rights and at the same time the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment’s efforts to end the war in the north of the country.
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Synthesis Report Findings
Looking at these findings in a comparative context, this report 
argued that, consistent with the above comments, the programme 
with Vietnam was the most successful, followed by that with Laos 
and then Sri Lanka. The success in Vietnam was thought to reflect 
the very strong and developmentally productive relationship 
between the Vietnamese and Swedish governments. Sweden was 
viewed by Vietnam as an old and trusted friend, and this put Swe-
den in a position in which it was able to achieve significant develop-
ment results through the development co-operation program. A sim-
ilar relationship existed with Laos, but capacity constraints were 
thought to have limited the success of Swedish development co-oper-
ation with this country. The prime reason for the relative ineffective-
ness of co-operation with Sri Lanka was the absence of such a rela-
tionship, especially from the mid-2000s onward, and a failure by 
Sweden to fully appreciate the drivers of conflict reduction.
This synthesis, with respect to criteria for phasing out or continu-
ing development co-operation with a given partner country, pro-
posed that four guiding questions be addressed. These questions 
were: (i) What are the principal, over-riding development objectives 
of the development co-operation programme with this country? (ii) 
To what extent have these objectives been achieved? (iii) If these 
objectives have not been fully achieved, is there any potential for 
them to be achieved by the donor in question? and (iv) If they are not 
achieved, what is the likelihood of the donor group that remains in 
the partner country achieving them?
With respect to decisions to commence or re-commence a pro-
gramme of development co-operation with a potential recipient, the 
following guiding questions were proposed: (i) What will be the prin-
cipal, over-riding developmental objectives of the development co-
operation programme with the country? (ii) What is the likelihood of 
these objectives being achieved? (iii) Is there any potential for them 
to be achieved by the donor in question? and (iv) if they are not 
achieved, what is the likelihood of other donors currently in the 
partner country achieving them?
5.3 ISSuES FoR FuRThER ConSIDERATIon
This report notes that decisions to phase out or continue a develop-
ment co-operation programme with a partner country are not made 
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in isolation, but in the context of a number of programmes. The 
donor might phase out some and continue with others. This however 
calls for a systematic approach to these decisions, which are made on 
the relative case to stay or go, taking into account information about 
all programmes with partner countries. The report provides a pre-
liminary discussion of this issue, but stops well short of outlining in 
any detail a system that could be used in this context. This issue 
obviously requires far more consideration, should there be interest in 
Sida and other relevant stakeholders for such an approach. The 
same comments apply to decisions to commence or re-commence 
a programme of development co-operation with a potential partner 
country.
Finally, the report emphasizes the importance of relationships as 
a driver of successful development co-operation and that, on face 
value this applies to all or at least the vast majority of substantive 
development co-operation programmes. This is also an issue requir-
ing further investigation. However, how do we define and conceptu-
alize a relationship? The evaluation reports provided clues as to 
what this might be, including a relationship in which there can be 
frank and honest exchange of views. However there would appear to 
be much more to a relationship than this, in a development context, 
and this needs exploration. There is also the issue of how we might 
assess or measure the extent to which a relationship is conducive to 
achieving positive development results, and what determines the 
quality of a relationship. Answering these questions and deriving 
appropriate responses for aid policy and practice could significantly 
enhance development co-operation effectiveness with all partner 
countries, providing for larger reductions in global poverty than 
have been achieved to date.
